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Increasing the quality and efficiency of public policies has been one of the main puzzles 
for politicians and scientists alike for several millennia; dozens of public administration 
reform attempts have tried to enhance public service delivery. When facing a new 
challenge, it might seem logical for decision-makers to rely on already existing 
examples and best practices, however the transplantation and transfer of existing ideas 
and mechanisms usually fail or do not lead to the desired end result. 
My thesis looks at a special type of policy change, which is policy transfer. The 
assumption is, that policy transfer cannot permeate different public administration 
traditions easily due to the different set of formal and informal institutions, and path 
dependencies originating in the different decision-making logics. Hungary is a subtype 
of the continental public administration culture, and within that it falls into the Central 
European country group  (Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2019), where legalism and not 
efficiency is driving the decision-making logic (Gajduschek & Hajnal, 2010). Based on 
this my thesis assumes, that Performance Management’s (PM), as an efficiency-
promoting (van Dooren, et al., 2015), dominantly Anglo-Saxon public management 
instrument (Bouckaert & Halligan, 2008) appearance in Hungary is contra-intuitive, due 
to the theoretical (G. Fodor & Stumpf, 2007) and practical (Hajnal, 2014b) modus 
operandi of Hungarian public administration, as these are not conducive to the existence 
of a PM system in the country.  
My goal is to understand, that desipte these constraining factors how PM can enter the 
Hungarian discourse and whether it can be successfully implemented (Hajnal & 
Ugrósdy, 2015), and what contextual factors are promoting the appearance of PM. To 
achieve this goal, I apply the concept of policy transfer, which acts as the conveyor belt 
of policy ideas and best practices within and between countries, and I assume that 
policy transfer will lead to the implementation of PM at the three observed 
organizations. I hope that answering my research questions will promote the 
understanding of policy transfer between different administrative traditions, as many of 
the recent and current reform attempts are traveling across time, space and cultures, just 
as PM appears in Hungary. I intend to reflect my observations to the wider public policy 
reform agenda.  
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My primary focus is to prove or falsify whether PM can take a root in Hungary through 
policy transfer, as it is considered alien to Hungarian public administration culture. 
2. Conceptual and theoretical framework 
One of the basic assumptions of the policy transfer literature is that transfer leads to 
better policies, because nobody would like to copy failing policies (Dolowitz & Marsh, 
2000), however learning from the mistakes of others still has a value for decision-
makers.. This assumption is very optimistic though, as most of the transfer literature is 
trying to explain the root causes of failed transfers and not on the successful and 
working examples (Stone, 2012). 
I consider policy transfer as a part of the concept of policy change. Policy change – not 
surprisingly – is the change of one of more policies to one or more new policies, by 
creating new or changing or terminating older policies (Lester & Stewart, 1996, p. 136). 
Policy change is not happening to governments, but governments are actively shaping 
the change itself, being one of the most important actors in the process (Bennett & 
Howlett, 1992, p. 275). Policy change can be not only the result of exogene pressure, 
but cultural determinants as well as the nature of the policy sector, the interest of the 
actors and the configuration of the institutions have a significant impact in the process 
of change (Capano, 2003). 
It is possible to differentiate between five distinct theories within the concept of policy 
change. Incrementalism (Lindblom, 1959) claims that public administration decision-
making does not take all alternatives into account but the closest ones to the status quo, 
and hence it concedes the possibility of finding the best solution. These decisions 
contain less risk and uncertainty as change itself will be not so dramatic and 
bureaucracy will cooperate. Neoinstitutionalism traces back change to the overall 
features of institututional design, political agency and perceived performance (March & 
Olsen, 2011). Historical experience significantly decreases the scope of policy change, 
and it depends on the nature of the policy area how quick and deep change can be 
(Howlett & Ramesh, 1998). Kingdon’s idea of policy streams and policy entrepreneurs 
focuses on the constellation of different factors which he terms “policy windows” 
(Kingdon, 2014). The Advocacy Coalition Framework identifies interest groups as the 
source and driver of change (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The theory of punctuated 
equilibrium claims that the shift of political attention will be the source of policy 
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change, and this will break the policy monopoly of bureaucracy over the policy issue in 
focus (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009).  
Policy transfer is a possible model for policy change, which is rooted in 
neoinstitutionalist theories. I chose to focus on institutions due to the assumption based 
on Kuhlmann and Wollmann (2019), who claim that in the Central European 
administrative model institutions are significantly different from those of the Anglo-
Saxon or even the Continental Napoleonic models. This difference in administrative 
culture makes Hungary a least likely case of the appearance of PM. My objective is to 
find out how PM, as a policy tool rooted in the Anglo-Saxon administrative tradition 
can permeate the Hungarian context I must look at the differences between the 
institutional framework and how – despite the differences – PM can exist in Hungary. 
Within the neoinstitutionalist approach, I focus on policy transfer, which I consider the 
conveyor belt of policy ideas and practice across different jurisdictions.  
Policy transfer is a process, when “knowledge about policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in 
the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in 
another political setting” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, p. 5). This concept describes how 
policy ideas, tools or just the thinking about certain policy problems and solutions travel 
across time and space, especially between different jurisdictions domestically and 
internationally. 
Within the concept of policy transfer there several, often sinonymous and a bit 
confusing terms: policy transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996), policy learning (Evans, 
2006), policy diffusion (Simmons & Elkins, 2004), a lesson-drawing (Rose, 1993), and 
europeanization (Radaelli, 2003). 
Based on the literature, I consider policy transfer as the main concept, which describes 
how public policy ideas, instruments, and management tools travel from one place to 
another both in time and space. Policy learning is a special form of policy transfer, 
which Dolowitz and Marsh described as voluntary transfer, hence policy learning is still 
a broad concept, but narrower than policy transfer which can be coercive as well  
(Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Policy transfer can be further broken down to different 
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models, two of which are voluntary, namely policy diffusion (Weigrich, 2009), and 
lesson drawing (Rose, 1991), while europeanization (Radaelli, 2003) is coercive. 
Strang describes diffusion as the process „where prior adoption of a trait or practice in a 
population alters the probability of adoption for remanining non-adapters” (Strang, 
1991, p. 325). Wasserfallen claims that the research of policy diffusion focuses on how 
policy decisions taken somewhere influence decisions somewhere else with the 
modethods of learning, competition and emulation  (Wasserfallen, 2018, p. 622).  
Radaelli posits that Europeanization consists of the processes, with which formal and 
informal rules, regulations, policy paradigms and styles, as well as problem solving 
methods, common beliefs and norms are being set first at the European level, and how 
these later become part of national discourses, identities, political structures and public 
policies (Radaelli, 2003, p. 30).  
Lesson drawing, according to Rose is the model of how a certain policy program can 
move from one place to another, and not what has to be done according to the 
politicians (Rose, 1991, p. 5). According to Rose’s approach, the main objective of 
lesson drawing is to decide whether an already existing best practice is appropriate for 
adoption at another jurisdiction. 
I look at PM primarily as a public management tool, even though I have to underline 
that PM as a principle have existed at least for a hundred years, which aims to 
rationalize and quantify public decision-making (van Dooren & Hoffmann, 2018). 
Following a strong positivist tradition PM claims that political and social processes can 
be understood, and they follow a certain logic, and if we understand this logic, we can 
make better and more effective decisions (van Dooren, et al., 2015). Performance 
movement have thus become a doctrine which influences public management to a large 
extent up until today (van Dooren, 2008), and dominated public administration reform 
discourse at least from the early 2000s. 
van Dooren and his colleagues define PM as a “management style which incorporates 
performance information in decision-making” (van Dooren, et al., 2015, p. 37). Askim 
theorizes that PM means performing three routine tasks, 1) the measurement of 
organizational outputs and outcomes, 2) processing the results of the measurement, 
benchmarking them against prior performance or normative standards and 3) 
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communicating the results to decision-makers and citizens (Askim, 2008, p. 125). 
Bouckaert and Halligan consider a PM-oriented public administration to take and 
delegate responsibility for the performance of the entire system, and thus the 
administration becomes accountable for the success of failure of the public policy 
programs (Bouckaert & Halligan, 2008, p. 2). Vigoda-Gadot and Mizrahi thinks that 
PM is an approach which focuses on the outputs and outcomes of public organziations, 
and uses performance data in decision-making and public policy-making (Vigoda-Gadot 
& Mizrahi, 2014). 
Finally, some words about the context within which the entire research takes place. PM 
is considered as a primarily Anglo-Saxon public management tool which is deeply 
rooted in the public interest-based administrative tradition (Bouckaert & Halligan, 
2008), but it can be found in certain Western European developed countries, where the 
administrative tradition is still continental (van Dooren & Hoffmann, 2018). However, 
due to the influence of international organizations like the OECD or the EU, or various 
public administration reform waves it influenced countries where this primarily results- 
and process-based approach does not have any historical or cultural roots (Bouckaert, 
2012).  
I chose the case of Hungary, because the dominant Central European administrative 
culture is very distant from the Anglo-Saxon administrative tradition (Jenei, 2008), 
which is considered the natural habitat of PM. My claim is that despite of these cultural 
differences, PM can effectively function in the hostile Hungarian context (Hajnal & 
Ugrósdy, 2015). Following the neo-institutionalist approach, this assumption is against 
the expectations as the most probable observation based on the literature should be the 
appearance of incrementatlism and the logic of appropriateness.  
Earlier, Éva Révész has been researching PM in Hungary (Kiss & Révész, 2014) and 
identified policy transfer as a possible source of the appearance of PM (Révész, 2015), 
but her research had other objectives, and this justifies why a more thorough 
investigation of the role of transfer is necessary, so my research fills an existing gap in 
the literature about how PM can get a foothold in Hungarian public administration. 
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3. Research questions, hypothesis and methods 
The definition of PM and efficiency found in the international literature differs from the 
definitions of the Hungarian public administration. Furthermore, compared to public 
interest-based polities that first led to PM’s functioning and evolution Hungary follows 
the Central European model, which differs from the Anglo-Saxon model both in its 
tools and objectives (Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2019). Based on this difference, I 
consider Hungary as a least likely case for the appearance of PM, mostly due to the 
different administrative culture and the contextual factors which I will detail in the 
Findings. My goal is to understand what makes PM appear and function in such a 
hostile environment, and whether policy transfer plays any role in that. Further to the 
arguments laid out in Chapter 2, Pollitt and Bouckaert’s 4M typology reinforces my 
claims as according to the authors Central European bureaucracies rather belong to the 
modernizers (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017), which discover the necessity for change but 
not because its novelty but rather because of the need for better public service delivery 
(cf. the Magyary Reform Programs of the Hungarian Government), while PM clearly 
falls into the marketizers category, underlining the importance of private management 
methods and the empowering of public managers (ibid). These claims make Hungary an 
even less likely case in my opinion. 
My assumption is that policy transfer can cause the appearance of PM in Hungary. This 
makes policy transfer the independent and the appearance of PM the dependent variable 
in my study (cf. Marsh & Evans, 2012). Following Weigrich’s (2009) criteria I must 
make sure that a) policy transfer induces significant policy change and b) outside 
influence must be decisive in the process of change. Benson and Jordan (2011) claim 
that the subject of policy transfer might be not only entire policies, but rather policy 
elements and instruments as well, which supports my claim PM can be a subject of 
policy transfer. Benson and Jordan’s findings underline that domestic policy transfer 
can be even more effective and important as the international transfer (ibid.), which 
highlights the importance of my local government embedded case. I must pay attention 
to the contextual factors, especially policy and administrative capacity ,which is needed 
to operate complex and expensive management instruments like PM, and I have to 
uncover the conditional determinants as well as the factors which support and hinder the 
appearance of PM in Hungary. 
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Out of the several possible policy transfer models I intend to test three on the Hungarian 
empirical data, based on neo-institutionalist theory: policy diffusion (logic of 
consequences), lesson drawing (logic of appropriateness) and Europeanization 
(isomorphism) with comparing my three embedded cases to the theoretical predictions. 
These three seem to be applicable to the Hungarian context: Europeanization was the 
main driver of policy change for the last at least 20 years, while the two logics are 
deeply rooted in the literature. 
I chose the neo-institutionalist approach because I believe that social and political 
institutions preset what might the appropriate way to follow, but they also narrow down 
the possible sources of transfer as well, pre-setting which rules can be transferred and 
how they should be interpreted (March & Olsen, 2011, p. 482). If doubt emerges about 
what best practices are the most appropriate, the main filter will be similarity, and 
decision-makers will adapt the most appropriate solution to their problem. In addition, 
already existing best practices will reinforce the assumption that those programs exist 
because they are functioning better and lead to better solutions (ibid, p. 486). The 
Rechtsstaat-tradition which influences Hungary to a large extent is deeply connected to 
the logic of appropriateness, even though the ever-expanding welfare state is more 
focused on the logic of consequences (ibid, p. 490). This puzzle will be one of the core 
questions of my thesis as well. 
The logic of consequences is applied to decisions where the expectations about the 
possible results were driving the decision-making process, while decision-makers are 
rather focused on their own or their communities’ interests and have a general tendency 
to disregard institutional boundaries. The logic of appropriateness on the other hand 
follows a rules-based logic, in this case political actors will base their decisions on 
socially constructed, well-known and accepted rules and practices (Goldmann, 2005, p. 
36). The two logics are not mutually exclusive though: even Goldmann warns that the 
logic of appropriateness encompasses a wider motivational spectrum, and therefore it 
may contain the logic of consequences at certain times (ibid., p. 44).  
Based on these considerations I have two research questions: 





RQ2: if proliferation happens, then which transfer model and with which 
enabling and disabling factors explains it best? 
The two RQs set the theoretical ambition of my thesis too: as on the Hungarian case all 
of the three transfer models have limited explaining value, I intend to identify those 
enabling and disabling factors, which make the appearance of PM possible in the 
Central European administrative context. My expectation is that using the findings of 
my thesis, it will be possible to understand how administrative reforms alien to the 
domestic administrative culture can be successfully implemented in Hungary or the 
wider Central-European context. 
According to William Trochim (1985) social science research is about matching the 
patterns of ideas and reality. Even experiments follow this logic as in that case there is 
an original theoretical pattern which describes how a property of the treatment group 
will change as a result of the intervention, the observed pattern will be the change itself. 
Yin (2009) claims that pattern matching is the most desired logic for case studies (Yin, 
2009, p. 161). In this case, the empirically observed patterns will be compared with the 
predicted patterns derived from earlier theory. A matching pattern strengthens the 
internal validity of the research. Predicted patterns however must be defined even 
before data collection commences. Data collected during the empirical research can 
influence predictions too: some theories can be discarded even during the data 
collection phase of the research. Pattern matching can be useful to identify gaps in 
existing theory, as well as to construct new explanations (Almutairi, et al., 2014); this is 
clearly my ambition too.  
Sinkovics claims that pattern matching requires the researcher to explain their thinking 
and applied mental models, and calls for a strict and appropriate contextualization and 
operationalization, which reinforces the methodological solidity of the research 
(Sinkovics, 2018). An early theorist of pattern matching, Donald T. Campbell (1966) 
conceded that patterns of theory and data naturally influence the thinking of the 
researcher, but in order to test theories, theories and observations should be separable.  
Hak and Dul (2009) underline the most important definitions of pattern matching: 
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• a pattern is any constellation of observations while constellation means that the 
pattern itself is not random;  
• theories “predict” the patterns of certain values or variables, these predictions 
are usually called hypotheses; 
• “expected pattern” is the pattern derived from the hypotheses, which will be later 
compared with the “actual pattern” based on the observations.  
Following the pattern matching logic I apply the expected patterns based on the – 
theoretically – rival explanations. This logic can uncover the role of different 
independent variables in the observed change. As Yin highlights: this method is suitable 
to discover why that certain outcome happened which was observed (Yin, 2009, pp. 
163-164). 
My research is an embedded case study, where the case is the Hungarian public 
administration and the embedded cases are the local government of Eger, the Higher 
Education Information System run by the Education Office and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade’s Strategic Performance Management System. My research is mostly 
based on semi-structured interviews conducted with key informants (27 interviews over 
five years), and partly on the documents which were kindly shared by my interlocutors. 
The thesis follows a qualitative research strategy, and has a primarily explanative, but 
partly explorative ambition. All three embedded cases were chosen via informed 
sampling, following the exemplary case logic. 
I will test the three – supposedly – rival explanations on the classic Dolowitz-Marsh 
(2000) transfer model, which is the most cited one of its kind. Rows will contain the 
three transfer mechanisms, while the columns will contain the different dimensions of 
the Dolowitz-Marsh model. 
According to Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) if transfer is to be used to explain any kind of 
policy change, then it has to be established why the transfer took place after all, and one 
must understand the transfer process using the questions of the transfer framework. The 
main questions are: who participates in the transfer; what is being transferred; what is 
the source; to what extent something is transferred; what are the enabling and disabling 
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factors; what are the motivations  (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). I will be using only four 
of these questions to establish the dimensions of the prediction matrix. 
Based on the literature and the Hungarian context the following predictions can be made 
about the presence of PM in Hungary. My assumption is that out of the three models 
europeanization will not be present as there is no central regulation to introduce PM to 
Hungary (with the possible exception of different European Union funded projects). EU 
accession undoubtedly played an important role in the development of Hungarian public 
administration, but in the case of PM I do not think this would be the case, and the 
claims of the literature support this prediction as well. 
The appearance of diffusion seems less likely too. None of the three organizations 
observed in this study have any competitors domestically, therefore group pressure or 
the race to attract consumers/taxpayers is not a motivating factor for them. The lack of 
policy, but especially administrative capacity will be a futher disabling factor, the 
computing capacity and political enabling factors which could support the logic of 
consequences will be lacking due to organizational culture. Another claim which makes 
diffusion less likely is that Continental public administration traditions tend to be closer 
to the incrementalist approach. 
Based on the literature, the most likely theory to explain the presence of PM in Hungary 
is the logic of appropriateness. The issue of “what might work”, tensions within the 
organizations, path dependencies based on the similarity with other programs and the 
primarily incrementalist approach of Hungarian public administration all point towards 
lesson drawing as the most plausible explanation out of the three tested in this study. 
This leads me to my hypothesis as well: 
H: due to the dominant role of the Central European administrative 
tradition the logic of appropriateness, thus lesson drawing will describe best 
how PM will appear in Hungary.  
Mechanism 
Nature of the 
transfer 
Source Enabling / disabling factors Motivation 
diffusion (LoC) voluntary 
copying leading jurisdictions 
(push factors), role of 
political principals 
(legitimacy, cf. motivation) 
political and administrative capacity (or 
the lack of it); domestic and international 
networks; possible political and legitimacy 
gains from transfer; PM as a social 
construct – introduction might be a(n 
implicit) expectation; alien to Rechtsstaat-
culture 
making and demonstrating 
rational decision-making; 
satisfycing solutions; 




voluntary / mixed 
(peer pressure) 
bureaucrats dissatisfied with 
the status quo, looking at 
programs working elsewhere, 
but bureaucratic logic 
prevails based on similarities 
transfer is an iterative process, slow and 
comfortable, but sometimes creative; only 
minor changes to existing institutional 
framework; fits better into bureaucratic 
logic; most common development model 
of Rechtsstaat-type administrations 
convergence based on the 
logic of „what might work” 




coercive acquis communautaire 
adaptive pressures (but playing the system 
might also occur – establishment of 
NUTS2 regions in Hungary), 
isomorphisms 
EU requirements; pressure 
to access EU funds 
(conditionality), but the 
local leadership might have 
their own goals too 
The prediction matrix based on the three mechanisms (Source: own compilation) 
4. Findings 
The three embedded cases are providing a good overview of the Hungarian public 
administration system. Eger is a fairly well-off and mid-sized Hungarian town, which is 
also a county seat therefore it can afford to have a sizeable public service – this enables 
the presence of the much-needed administrative capacity for PM to function properly. 
The Higher Education Information System (FIR) of the Education Office, a single-
purpose central government agency is an online platform which contains all the data of 
university students and lecturers, and it is daily updated automatically with the most 
recent data from the higher education institutions. The Strategic Performance 
Management System (STMR) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade is monitoring 
the operations of Hungarian diplomatic missions abroad based on the categorizations of 
the different telegrams the missions are sending home every day.  
In the embedded case of Eger policy transfer is voluntary, and largely based on the 
decision of the mayor, however public managers on the lower level are always on the 
lookout for working best practices which they can adapt to their own operations. There is 
a major difference between service areas as far as PM is concerned: the more quantifiable 
a service are, the more PM will be expected to provide better results and support the 
management. In the field of urban services (road maintenance, cleaning of ditches, 
gardening, solid waste disposal) as well as in the municipal library there is a significant 
awareness of PM. The library is clearly an exemplary organization as it not only runs its 
own PM system, but regularly published performance information – even benchmarked 
results – on its website. Human services on the other hand are rather resistant to any kind 
of measurement, therefore PM has still a long way to go in that service area. The source 
of transfer is mostly domestic, the main objective is to solve existing problems quickly, 
cheaply, and effectively. The only interviewee who mentioned the role of PM in 
promoting legitimacy and transparency as well as citizen trust way the mayor – but 
ironically, he was not reelected in 2019. 
It was clearly visible during the interviews that on the lower managerial level the most 
important motivation was to optimize financial resources, and PM was perceived as a tool 
to serve this objective. Continuous depletion of local government responsibilities, funds 
and resources forced local governments to do more with less, while citizen expectations 
about service delivery have only risen in the last few years, even though the average 
16 
 
citizen does not know what is the responsibility of the LG, and what is the responsibility 
of the central government. This was a challenge frequently mentioned by the mayor and 
public managers in Eger, and due to this the main objective of PM is to avoid the 
spectacular waste of resources, and to establish technocratic legitimacy. Supporting the 
activities and results with numbers was an objective that all interlocutors wanted to reach 
by using PM in their service area. 
In the embedded case of FIR, transfer seems to be voluntary. When asked about the 
source of PM knowledge though, interviewees have highlighted the importance of a 
World Bank-sponsored program which started in 1998, so transfer was conditional back 
then, and even though the Management Information System which was to be built using 
World Bank funds did not become fully operational until a major overhaul in 2012 which 
led to the establishment of FIR, it has influenced thinking within the organization to a 
large extent. Enabling factors include the usability and reliability of data, high level of 
data generation automation and the presence of the necessary administrative capacity, but 
there is a general disappointment in the staff of the Education Office that decision-makers 
are not using the data that is being produced. Motivations include push-pull factors 
(foreign examples, lack of funds), but there is a need for technocratic legitimacy as well, 
which would enable the leaders of higher education institutions and bureaucrats to 
counter ad-hoc political decisions. 
The embedded case of FIR is a good example of how ideas and practices from a different 
time and place influence the thinking of the senior bureaucrats, leading to a very high 
standard reporting system which – theoretically – could be used a proper PM system as 
well if there was a need from the political principals to base their decisions on reliable 
data. 
STMR of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade is a highly complex system which 
was introduced after years of research and joint work with a consulting company. The 
caveat in this embedded case is that participation in STMR and producing data is not 
mandatory for all foreign missions, therefore the system itself remains incomplete. 
Despite of these challenges, the awareness from PM is clearly visible in the professional 
leadership of the Ministry: the desire to make better decisions, to learn from others and 
the overall level of moral and technical support from the senior management sets this 
embedded case apart from the other three. Problems exist however: like the two other 
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embedded cases and in line with the observations of the academic literature, we see that 
the resistance towards measurement, playing the system and institutional inertia / 
resistance clearly exist. Transfer is voluntary, and before designing the current system a 
widespread effort was made to identify relevant benchmarks and possible best practices, 
but these acted only as a form of inspiration for the Hungarian version at the end. Many 
assumptions of the performance movement can be discovered in the embedded case of 
STMR even though the operative arm of the ministry is also led by diplomats who do not 
necessarily have a background in (public) management.  
5. Discussion 
Looking at the four dimensions, I was able to make the following observations. 
Nature of the transfer: voluntary in all three embedded cases; conditionality was present 
only in the original, 1998 World Bank-sponsored origins of FIR. Isomorphism is clearly 
not present at either of the cases, we do not see any kind of peer pressure or the fear of 
being left behind, which rules out mimetic isomorphism. There are no central government 
regulations which mandate the introduction of PM at any level of the Hungarian public 
administration, which makes coercive isomorphism impossible. Normative isomorphism 
would be possible if we knew the background of the decision-makers, but looking at them 
more closely we will find that there is nothing common in their education or social 
background, therefore they cannot have the same belief systems. Furthermore, while both 
Eger and the higher education sector have seen their funds shrink during the last years, 
the budget of the Ministry have been increased six-fold between 2010-2019.  
Source of the transfer: in all three embedded cases sources are most likely to be the 
similar organizations at home and abroad. In the case of the local government similar LGs 
have a significant impact on the thinking and source-seeking behavior of Eger. Almost all 
Hungarian local governments are facing the same problems (scarcity of funds, ever-
changing regulation), and all interlocutors have underscored the importance of learning 
from other municipalities, and this was augmented by the inputs of the representatives of 
the national associations as well. Access to foreign sources is usually limited due to the 
lack of foreign languages spoken, and the unreliable availability of travel (mostly due to 
financial reasons). In the embedded cases of the two other, central government 
organizations the source of transfer is obviously foreign, but it serves rather as source of 
inspiration than a direct blueprint. The most decisive factor seems to be the accessibility 
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of existing best practices, and which are close to the Hungarian administrative tradition as 
well. Administrative capacities (or the lack thereof) obviously plays a significant role, my 
observation is that the more specialized, PM-oriented staff works in the organization, the 
more likely it is that they will produce a reliable PM system which can serve the needs of 
the political principals too. 
Enabling and disabling factors were easy to find in all three embedded cases. Reliable 
and up-to-date data is crucial for PM, and if these are regularly produced and used that 
helps to establish the legitimacy of PM within the organization. Knowing this, it might 
come as a surprise that during the transfer, data generation and processing skills are not in 
the forefront. In the case Eger, the existence of administrative capacities was an important 
factor, as the organization must be large enough to be able to afford the work of a few 
data analysts. Furthermore, the availability and affordability of ICT tools helps the 
spreading of PM as well. The coordinating efforts of the national associations (where 
applicable) further promotes PM-oriented thinking especially in the embedded case of the 
LG. Support from political principals is a key factor in all three embedded cases, while 
the “dashboard” of the Ministry’s PM system is a prime example of how data can be 
presented concisely to the senior management of an organization.  
Looking at disabling factors, the negative cultural attitude of the Hungarian public 
administration context to measurement seems to be the most serious obstacle, which is 
clearly visible in the debates around PM introduction. The lack of data processing 
capabilities (despite the desire to develop it and the available administrative capacity) 
seems to limit the possible impact of PM within the organizations. In the Ministry we can 
see that the lack of sanctions seriously limits participation in the reporting process, and 
this undermines the robustness of existing datasets as well. 
Motivation is the key question regarding my hypothesis and the assumptions that the 
logic of appropriateness will drive policy transfer in the Hungarian case, and this is where 
the empirical results were the most surprising. The overall expectation form the principals 
who have been interviewed was focusing on the consequences of policy transfer, most 
importantly the expectation was that their organization will work more effectively leading 
to better and more efficient public service delivery. In order to achieve this goal, they 
were ready to look at solutions fairly alien to the Hungarian administrative tradition and 
take personal and political risks. The reason senior managers were looking for working 
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best practices somewhere else was thus rooted in the logic of consequences instead of my 
original expectation, which assumed that due to cultural factors the logic of 
appropriateness will prevail. Another sign indicating the logic of consequences was that 
all of the interviewees have wanted to leapfrog their arrears in management practices, and 
there was no outside pressure to introduce PM, therefore these organizations did not have 
to look for the appropriate answers to their problems.  






Enabling / disabling 
factors 
Motivation 





Proven in the 
case of FIR 





Not proven Not proven Not proven 
 
Thus, the answer to RQ1 is that all of the major arguments of the transfer literature appear 
in the Hungarian case, but most importantly the openness towards best practices, the role 
of professional networks and organizations, as well as management needs. Support from 
the highest political level is critical for a successful PM introduction to the Hungarian 
context, which is augmented by the appearance of a rational actor who wants change to 
happen based on the logic of consequences, the possible outcomes of transfer. This means 
that progress may take greater leaps forward at a time, overcoming a significant gap in 
administrative culture.  
The answer to RQ2 is that the most similar mechanism to the Hungarian case is policy 
diffusion, but in reality it is really hard to find a “clean” version of any of the three 
mechanisms, as they tend to mix based on the needs of the jurisdiction at hand.  
The hypothesis was falsified, as the main logic of transfer in the Hungarian case was the 
logic of consequences, which was a highly unusual observation based on the literature I 
have reviewed for this study. Despite the overall experience of the Hungarian 
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administrative culture, its closeness to the incremental and appropriate steps and reform 
attempts, in the case of PM as a result of policy transfer the logic of consequences has the 
most convincing explanatory power.  
6. Conclusion 
My thesis focused on the role of policy transfer in the Hungarian public administration 
innovation process. Contrary to my expectations, the logic of consequences prevailed 
instead of the logic of appropriateness despite the claims of the literature that the Central 
European PA model is closer to the incrementalist tradition where only small changes are 
likely to happen. I consider this finding the most important one and clearly this should be 
my contribution to the overall scientific discourse about policy transfer. Based on my 
embedded case studies, I was able to highlight several enabling and disabling factors 
which influence policy transfer, the most important being political support from the 
senior management as well as the necessary administrative capacity to run the PM 
system. Out of the three transfer mechanisms checked, policy diffusion is the closest to 
the Hungarian empirical data. 
Based on my findings, I can confidently claim that despite being a contraintuitive 
assumption, PM can enter the Hungarian PA context and work within the unhospitable 
environment. This is a significant observation, as the Hungarian government officially 
rejects NPM, but party due to the influence of NWS, and partly due to the management 
needs of public organizations some tools from the NPM ecosystem can survive within the 
new Hungarian setup as well, and will be mentioned in strategic documents as well. The 
role of transfer is not omnipotent though, best practices are rather serving as a form of 
inspiration for decision-makers rather than exact blueprints to be copied in other 
jurisdictions.  
The Hungarian case resembles the idea of “policy bricolage”, coined by Diane Stone 
(Stone, 2012), in which transfer acts is an important, but not crucial part of policy change. 
As Gajduschek and Hajnal (2010) underline, it is absolutely rational to expect decision-
makers to look for mental shortcuts and thus existing best practices which are working 
somewhere else, therefore policy transfer is not a rarity even in the Hungarian context.  
My research has obvious limitations: sampling methods do not allow for representativity 
therefore I relied on a qualitative research strategy and used the method of embedded case 
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study. The conceptualization of PM in the Hungarian context is very weak, and this might 
have led to measurement bias and swimsuit issues in the empirical phase of my study. A 
further form of criticism may be the fact that all of the three embedded cases are 
exemplary ones, and they do not represent the Hungarian reality of the ground, despite the 
fact that some of my conversations – which are not used in this study – have clearly 
indicated the resistance of everyday bureaucrats to measurement in general and PM in 
particular. Future research may focus on further exploring why PM exists in Hungary, 
and how best practices influence and orientate the thinking of public managers. Another 
avenue for inquiry might be to study how changes in the political leadership influence the 
functioning of PM: the higher education sector was moved to another ministry after the 
reorganization of the government in 2018, while Eger elected a new mayor in 2019, it 
might be worth revisiting both embedded cases to see whether the approach towards PM 
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